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HOW FAR CAN THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION GO? HOW SEARCHES OF
COMPUTERS AND SIMILAR DEVICES
PUSH IT TO THE LIMIT
ANDREW WRONA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Joe is stopped by police for a traffic violation and the sight of
some drugs sitting on the front seat gives the police probable cause
to search his car. They look in the glove box, the center console,
and beneath the seats. Under the passenger seat is a brown paper
bag full of cocaine. Next, an officer boots up Joe's laptop, which
was sitting in the backseat. Searching for further evidence of
narcotics, he looks through the files on the hard drive. The officer
comes across Joe's family pictures, love poems he wrote to his wife,
and investment records. Finally, he finds some damning evidence
of participation in the narcotics trade on the computer. Joe seeks
to suppress all of this evidence because it is the product of a
warrantless search. The court will undoubtedly admit the bag of
cocaine into evidence under the automobile exception. But should
they interpret that exception to allow the warrantless search of
the laptop as well?
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence permits police to
search a vehicle and the containers within it without a warrant if
they have probable cause to believe it holds contraband or
evidence.' While a laptop computer or other mass storage deviceS2
such as a flash drive found in a car may hold evidence of a crime, it
also holds a vast and increasing amount of personal information. 3
* J.D. candidate, May 2011. 1 would like to thank my wife, Michelle, for
her constant love and support as I wrote this Comment, and my parents,
Larry and Camille, for teaching me the importance of education and always
encouraging me in my academic pursuits. Also, thank you Mary and Marie for
all of your support throughout my law school career.
1. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
2. Mass storage refers to "various techniques and devices for storing large
amounts of data." Webopedia Online Computer Technology Encyclopedia,
http://www.Webopedia.com/TERM/m/mass-storage.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2010). Mass storage devices have been identified as disk drives, tape drives,
and CD-ROM drives. Goldman v. Bracewell & Guiliani, L.L.P., No. 6:04-CV725-ORL-28JGG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23503, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13,
2005).
3. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
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The potential intrusiveness of a search of a laptop or other mass
storage device could not have been envisioned by Chief Justice
Taft when he carved out the automobile exception in 1925.4
This Comment will examine the automobile exception and
whether it should be applied to searches of laptops and other mass
storage devices. Part II will introduce the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, the origin, justification, and evolution of
the automobile exception, and the problem posed by laptops that
the Tenth Circuit recently had the opportunity to examine. Part
III will analyze the Supreme Court's reasoning in automobile
exception cases and examine how lower courts have dealt with the
additional privacy concerns mass storage devices inevitably bring
to warrantless searches.
Part IV proposes that warrantless searches of mass storage
devices should not fall under the automobile exception. Law
enforcement should only have the power to seize the device and
suspend any search until a warrant can be obtained. An exception
could be made in exigent circumstances, for example, when an
immediate search of a laptop could stop a crime in progress or
yield life saving information.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The FourthAmendment Warrant Requirement

The Fourth Amendment secures the people with the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that
no "[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .

. .

."5

The

Supreme Court consistently recognizes that searches conducted
without a warrant are per se unreasonable. 6 A warrant better
(noting that computers store "diaries, personal letters, medical information,
photos, and financial records."); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090
(10th Cir. 2009) (observing that laptops, hard drives, and flash drives have a
"unique ability to hold vast amounts of diverse personal information."); United
States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting "intimate
information is commonly stored on computers" and "[a] personal computer is
often a repository for private information the computer's owner does not
intend to share with others."). One manufacturer has released a flash drive
capable of storing 256 gigabytes of information. Kingston Unveils the World's
First 256GB USB Flash Drive (Jul. 22, 2009) http://www.physorg.com/newsl6
7461888.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). Another has introduced a 640
gigabyte portable hard drive which can store up to 182,000 digital photos or
168,000 digital music files. Toshiba Introduces High-Capacity 640GB Portable
Hard Drive for Backing Up Digital Memories and Valuable Personal Data,
NEWS BLAZE, Sept. 1, 2009, http://newsblaze.com/story/2009090119100200001
.pnw/topstory.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Arizona v. Gant 129 S.
Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984); United
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ensures that a search is proper because it is based on the probable
cause determination of a "neutral and detached magistrate,"
7
instead of an on-the-spot determination by a police officer.
There are several, "well-delineated" exceptions to the warrant
8
requirement, one of which is the "automobile exception." This
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 481 (1971). In Coolidge, Justice Stewart remarked:
The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional
law for decades . . . It is, or should be, an important working part of our
machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the
'well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers' who
are a part of any system of law enforcement. Id.
But see Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARV. LAW
REV. 757, 762 (1994) (questioning the underpinnings of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement). Professor Amar views the two commands
of the Fourth Amendment separately; searches and seizures must be only
reasonable, and warrants are limited by probable cause and particularity. Id.
at 762. Although the Supreme Court has linked these two commands, this is
not dictated by logic. Id. Professor Amar highlights the inconsistencies in the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by discussing the various
exceptions to the "warrant requirement." Id. at 764-70.
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Probable cause has
been defined as "[a] reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in
belief that the party is guilty of the offence with which he is charged." Stacey
v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
8. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570; Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999)
(per curiam); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (referencing merely that there are "welldelineated" exceptions). There are several other exceptions to the requirement.
For example, the Court has upheld a warrantless search by customs officials of
international mail at a New York post office. United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 624-25 (1977). Customs officials suspected certain envelopes
contained illegal narcotics and discovered heroin upon opening them. Id. at
609-10. The Court stated the general principle that "searches made at the
border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
border . . . ." Id. at 616. The basis for this rule is the country's sovereign right
to protect itself by searching persons and property entering the country. Id.
This principle has been applied by a lower court to allow the warrantless
search of an international passenger's laptop at an airport. United States v.
Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). Recently, the Court declined to
expand another exception to the warrant requirement. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at
1714. In that case, Rodney Gant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for
driving on a suspended license. Id. at 1715. Police arrested Gant in his
driveway, after he had parked his car and exited the vehicle. Id. After he was
handcuffed and locked in the back of a squad car, police proceeded to search
his vehicle, finding a bag of cocaine in a jacket pocket in the back seat. Id. In
reviewing Gant's motion to suppress evidence, the Court noted the exception
was premised on concerns of officer safety and evidence preservation. Id. at
1716. Finding no reasonable likelihood that Gant could have accessed any
weapons or evidence in his own vehicle while handcuffed in the back of a
squad car, the Court held the search unreasonable. Id. at 1719.
Similarly, the Court defeated an attempt to create a new "murder scene
exception" to the warrant requirement in a case involving the murder of a
police officer. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978). It recognized
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allows law enforcement to "search an automobile and the
containers within it where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained."
B. Originof the Automobile Exception: Carroll v. United States
In 1921, federal prohibition agents stopped suspected
bootleggers George Carroll and John Kiro, who were driving on a
suspected bootlegging route. 10 There was no evidence of
contraband in the Oldsmobile roadster visible to the agents." One
of the agents pounded his fist on the "lazyback" of the seat and
noticed it was harder than usual.12 He then tore open the lazyback
seat cushion and found it concealed sixty-eight bottles of liquor.1s
Carroll and Kiro were charged with violations of the National
Prohibition Act, and the defendants sought to have the evidence of
the liquor suppressed because the search lacked a warrant.14 The
that "the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making
warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid." Id. at 392. But the homicide detectives
who conducted a four-day warrantless search of the defendant's house were
not there for that purpose, nor did any other exigent circumstances exist. Id.
at 394. Although police have an interest in the prompt investigation of
murders, the Court "decline[d] to hold that the seriousness of the offense
under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under
the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search." Id. at 394. In addition,
the Court has ruled the warrant requirement may be dispensed with in
searches of students in public schools. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
340-42 (1985) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of
students under their authority without probable cause when the search is
reasonable under all of the circumstances).
9. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
10. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160. The federal agents had tried to arrange a
purchase of illegal alcohol months prior to the incident in this case. Id. at 171.
Because they were known bootleggers on a known bootlegging route, the Court
found the agents had probable cause to stop them. Id. at 160-61.
11. Id. at 172.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 172-74.
14. Id. at 132-33. The National Prohibition Act (also known as the Volstead
Act) was passed to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. National Prohibition
Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933). Congress
passed the statute in 1919 to "prohibit intoxicating beverages, and to regulate
the manufacture, production, use, and sale of high-proof spirits for other than
beverage purposes, and to insure an ample supply of alcohol and promote its
use in scientific research and in the development of fuel, dye, and other lawful
industries." Id., preface As means of enforcement the Act provided
When .

.

. any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of

transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon,
buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his
duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being
transported contrary to law.
§ 26. Violation of the act was only a misdemeanor. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 164.
The Eighteenth Amendment provided: "[Tihe manufacture, sale, or
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Supreme Court held that the search was legal and announced that
if a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile was
supported by probable cause, the search of the automobile or other
vehicle was valid.1 5
In justifying this rule, the Court looked back to a customs act
passed by the first Congress in 1789.16 That act allowed officials to
conduct a warrantless search when they had probable cause to
believe a ship or vessel concealed goods subject to duties.17
However, the act required agents to obtain a warrant prior to
searching for the same goods in a dwelling-house, store, or other
building.' 8 Chief Justice Taft postulated that the first Congress
made the distinction between ships and homes because in movable
vessels the contraband could easily be put out of reach of a search
warrant.19

The practical consideration of exigency was the impetus for
creating the automobile exception. 20 However, the Court was
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
15. Carroll,267 U.S. at 149, 162. The Court seemingly had to strain to find
probable cause in this case. Justice McReynolds's dissent, joined by Justice
Sutherland, took issue with the determination that the officers had probable
cause to stop and search the defendants. Id. at 163 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting). He argued that there was nothing suspicious about the
defendant's activity that day, except that they were driving on a road known
also to be a bootlegging route, and that they had, two and a half months
before, tried to sell the arresting officers illegal liquor. Id. at 174.
16. Id. at 150-51. The first Congress was also the body that proposed the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, in addition to the rest of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 150. The Court strove to interpret the Fourth Amendment "in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted. . . ."Id. at 149.
17. Id. at 150.
18. Id. at 151.
19. Id. The Court further noted that the Second and Fourth Congresses had
passed legislation evincing a similar understanding. Id. at 151. The Court also
looked at an 1815 statute that permitted officials to "stop, search, and
examine any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom they should suspect
there was merchandise which was subject to duty or had been introduced into
the United States in any manner contrary to law. . . ." Id. at 151; Law of Mar.
3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 1815.
20. See George M. Dery III, Missing the Big Picture: The Supreme Court's
Willful Blindness to FourthAmendment Fundamentals in Florida v. White, 28
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 571, 577 (2001) (noting that "the automobile exception was
a child of necessity and exigency . . . ."). Chief Justice Taft was concerned in
general about a rise in crime he felt was attributed to the automobile. See
Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibitionin the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 125 n.408 (2006) (quoting Taft as saying "the automobile is the
greatest instrument for promoting immunity of crimes of violence that I know
of in the history of civilization"). The Chief Justice remarked in an interview
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careful to note that more than mere inconvenience to the
government was necessary to create the exigency and fall under
the exception to the warrant requirement. 21
C. The Evolution of the Automobile Exception since Carroll
In Husty v. United States, the Court took up another
prohibition-era case involving bootlegging in Michigan just a few
years after Carroll.22 The Court applied the rule from Carroll
without question.23 Eighteen years later, despite the repeal of
Prohibition, the Court took up another case with facts similar to
Carroll, in Brinegar v. United States.24 The defendant was
convicted of illegally bringing liquor into Oklahoma in violation of
the Liquor Enforcement Act of 193625 and sought suppression of
evidence of liquor found in his car. 26 On facts in many ways
similar to the Carroll case, the Court affirmed the trial court's
determination that the warrantless search of the car was valid. 27
that the automobile produced an "incentive to commit crime" because it
allowed for city criminals to make a quick escape to the country and expand
their traditionally urban operations to the countryside. Id.
21. Carroll,267 U.S. at 156. Chief Justice Taft wrote:
[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used and when properly supported by affidavit and issued after
judicial approval protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages.
In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing
officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court
probable cause.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 699 (1931). The arresting and
searching officer in this case had a much more convincing claim of probable
cause. Id. at 701. He had arrested the defendant for bootlegging twice before
and had a detailed tip from a reliable informant that he would have illegal
liquor in his car at a particular time and place. Id. at 699-700.
23. Id. at 700.
24. 338 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1949).
25. Id. at 160. The Liquor Enforcement Act made it a misdemeanor to
transport intoxicating liquor (defined as greater than four percent alcohol) into
any state that prohibited such liquor. Liquor Enforcement Act of 1936, ch. 815,
§ 3(a), 49 Stat. 1928, 1928 (1936) (repealed, with certain provisions in 18
U.S.C. § 1262 (2006)). Oklahoma prohibited the production, sale, and
transportation of intoxicating liquor. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 1 (1941) (repealed
1959).
26. Brinegar,338 U.S. at 162.
27. Id. at 178. In dissent, Justice Jackson rendered a memorable quote
emphasizing the vital importance of the Fourth Amendment. After quoting the
language of the amendment, he stated:
These, I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the
catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is
so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one
of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government.
Id. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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In 1970, in Chambers v. Maroney, the Court departed from
the exigency justification that inspired Carroll.28 Police in that
case pulled the defendants over in their station wagon because
they matched a description of suspects of an armed robbery
committed just an hour before. 29 The police did not search the
vehicle at that time, but instead took the men into custody and
later conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle at the station.3 0
Despite the apparent lack of exigent circumstances, the Court held
that the search was valid because police had probable cause to
seize the vehicle.31
The Court faced the question of whether a movable container
found within a car could be lawfully searched without a warrant in
Robbins v. California.32 The plurality at that time declined to
extend the automobile exception to containers. 33 A year later, in
United States v. Ross, the Court looked back at the Carroll
decision and decided that the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment also allowed the search of movable containers found
within a vehicle. 34 Justice Stevens limited this extension of the
automobile exception with the probable cause requirement.3 5 He
noted that "[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."3 6
In California v. Acevedo, the Court reiterated its
interpretation of the exception in Ross and held it to apply to
containers that police suspect hold contraband, even if the
suspicion is formed before the containers are ever placed in a car. 37
The 6-3 decision abolished any distinction among containers that
are just coincidentally placed in a car and "interpret[ed] Carroll as
providing one rule to govern all automobile searches."38
28. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 52. The Court said it was debatable whether conducting an
immediate search of the car was a greater intrusion of Fourth Amendment
interests than seizing the car and holding it until a search warrant could be
obtained. Id. at 51-52.
32. 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981).
33. Id. at 425. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in this case provided the
basis for the Court's holding in the next case considered.
34. 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
35. Id. at 825.
36. Id.
37. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580. In two prior cases, the Court made a
distinction between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause only
to search a container. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 (1977);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979). If such a container
coincidentally was seized from an automobile, a warrant was required for
police to search it. Id.
38. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
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D. The Problem with Laptops and Other Mass Storage Devices
that the Tenth Circuit Confronted in United States v. Burgess
In July, 2007, Wyoming state police pulled over David
Burgess's 39 motor home on Interstate 80 to issue a citation for an
expired license plate.40 The canine unit alerted the officers to the
presence of narcotics, which initiated a search of the motor home
despite Burgess's request that they obtain a warrant. 41 The search
produced marijuana and cocaine, in addition to a laptop computer
and two external hard drives. 42
The officers did not search the computer or hard drives then,
but instead towed the vehicle and requested a warrant to search
for photographs of narcotics or coconspirators. 43 A warrant was
granted, and a search of the hard drives revealed child
pornography.44 Because Burgess questioned the validity of the
warrant, the government contended that the hard drives could be
searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. 45
The government pointed to an earlier Tenth Circuit case that
analogized the expectation of privacy in a computer to that of a
suitcase or briefease.46 Because the Supreme Court in Acevedo had
39. Like many others raising Fourth Amendment issues in their defense,
Burgess was not a particularly sympathetic character. See United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (remarking
"[It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.").
Burgess was a former owner of a Nevada brothel and charter member of a
Nevada chapter of the Hells Angels. Former Brothel Owner Gets 15 Years in
Child Porn Case, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (July 19, 2008), http://www.lvrj.cominews/
25644904.html; Ben Neary, Appeals Court Upholds Brothel Owner's
Conviction, BILLINGS GAZErrE (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.billingsgazette.com
/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article9f9d92c2-8b7a- 11de-8f08-001cc4c032
86.html.
40. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1082. The officer was also aware that the motor
home was associated with the Hell's Angels motorcycle club, so he called for a
drug canine unit to assist before pulling Burgess over. Id.
41. Id. at 1082-83.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1083.
44. Id. at 1084. The police viewed 200-300 of Burgess's personal digital
photographs before discovering the illicit material. Id. The special agent
examining the hard drives found at least 1,300 child pornography images. Id.
Burgess was indicted for knowing transportation of child pornography across
state lines (18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1)) and knowing possession of
child pornography transported in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2)). Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1087-88. The government focused on the Tenth Circuit's language
in United States v. Andrus, where they stated because "[a] personal computer
is often a repository for private information the computer's owner does not
intend to share with others" and "intimate information is commonly stored on
computers, it seems natural that computers should fall into the same category
as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items that 'command a high degree
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said the automobile exception allows, with probable cause, police
to search containers found in an automobile-even locked
briefcases-police may search laptops and hard drives found in an
automobile.4 7 Burgess argued that this would be a "radical"
expansion of the warrant exception that would "destroy a citizen's
expectation of privacy in his or her computer."4 8
The court examined the briefcase-computer analogy and
highlighted the key distinctions between the two, mainly the
massive amount of personal information a computer may
contain.49 It cautioned against oversimplifying the Fourth
Amendment analysis through analogy to other closed containers.5 0
Also, the court noted that authority to seize without a warrant
may be greater than authority to search without one. 51 The court
of privacy."' Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718. The Andrus case also involved child
pornography, but did not involve the automobile exception. Id. Instead, the
warrantless search of the defendant's computer was upheld on the basis of
consent to search given by the defendant's father. Id. at 712. The court
considered the expectation of privacy in a home computer compared to a
locked container such as a briefcase. Id. at 718. This will be discussed in Part
III.
47. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1088; Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
48. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2, United States v. Burgess, 576
F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-8053). Burgess also argued that because of
the vast amount of information a computer can hold, it is a "virtual home," not
just a container. Id. He worried that applying the automobile exception in this
way to his case would allow police to "conduct a general search of any
computer found in any automobile which was subject to a valid search under
the automobile exception." Id. It may seem unlikely that, even given this
power, police would use their finite resources to conduct such general searches
whenever an opportunity presented itself. However, it seems more plausible
when viewed in light of the law enforcement crackdown on child pornography
in recent years. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBATING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: FEDERAL AGENCIES COORDINATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS, BUT AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR FURTHER ENHANCEMENT

16

(2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03272.pdf (noting that at the federal
level, the U.S. Department of Justice (the DOJ), the Treasury Department,
and the U.S. Postal Service are all involved in combating child pornography);
Wendy Koch, Financial Firms Attack Child Porn, USA TODAY (May 26,
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-05-25-firms-fightonline-x.htm
(reporting that the DOJ is teaming up with companies such as Visa, Discover,
and Bank of America, who will block transactions of online child porn and help
the DOJ track sellers and buyers); Illinois Requires PornographyData, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/us/05illinois.html?_r
=1&scp=27&sq-child%20pornography%20enforcement&st-cse (reporting that
a new Illinois law requires computer technicians to report any customers
whose computers contain child pornography to law enforcement); Declan
McCullagh, FBI Posts Fake Hyperlinks to Snare Child Porn Suspects, CNET
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9899151-38.html
(reporting on FBI's use of sting operations to find users of child pornography).
49. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1088.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1089. The court quoted Justice Stevens concurrence in a plurality
opinion of Texas v. Brown:
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pondered whether the Supreme Court would treat a computer as it
does a briefcase, but ultimately did not come to a conclusion as it
ruled the search valid on other grounds. 52 The court affirmed
Burgess's conviction and upheld his fifteen- year prison sentence.53
III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze the Supreme Court's twin rationales
driving automobile exception cases: practical mobility concerns
and exigency, and the lesser-expectation of privacy in an
automobile. Additionally, this section examines the expectation of
privacy in mass storage devices in general.
A.

The Exigency and Mobility Rationale

The Supreme

Court in Carroll looked to exigency

and

practical policing issues in justifying the automobile exception and
did not discuss the lesser expectation of privacy individuals have
in their automobiles. 54 To ascertain the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, Chief Justice Taft considered statutes concerning
customs duties passed by the first Congresses. 55 He explained the
[]f there is probable cause to believe [an object] contains contraband,
the owner's possessory interest in the container must yield to society's
interest in making sure that the contraband does not vanish during the
time it would take to obtain a warrant. The item may be seized
temporarily. It does not follow, however, that the container may be
opened on the spot. Once the container is in custody, there is no risk
that evidence will be destroyed. Some inconvenience to the officer is
entailed by requiring him to obtain a warrant before opening the
container, but that alone does not excuse the duty to go before a neutral
magistrate.
460 U.S. 730, 749-50 (1983) (plurality) (Stevens, J., concurring).
52. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090. The court ultimately found the search
warrant for Burgess' computer and hard drives valid. Id. Burgess had argued
that the warrant, authorizing a search of "computer records," was overbroad.
Id. Specifically, he sought to strictly impose the Fourth Amendment's
particularity requirement for a warrant. Id. The court noted the unique nature
of a computer search prompted special considerations for this issue as well. Id.
at 1091. The requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," was especially important
considering a computer's ability to store a vast amount and array of personal
information in one place. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Due to these concerns,
the Tenth Circuit mandates that computer search warrants are limited to
"specific federal crimes or specific types of material." Burgess, 576 F.3d at
1091 (quoting United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009).
53. Id. at 1103.
54. Carroll,267 U.S. at 153; Dery, supra note 20, at 577.
55. Carroll,267 U.S. at 151. For example, The Act of 1789 authorized duty
collectors to enter, without a warrant, any ship or vessel where concealed
goods subject to duty were suspected. Law of July 31, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 29
(1789). The same statute, however, required a warrant for a similar search of
houses, stores, and other buildings. 1 Stat. at 43. The Second and Fourth
Congresses passed laws with similar distinctions for warrants. Collection of
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distinction those statutes made between searches of fixed
dwellings and searches of movable vessels by noting that the latter
could be easily "put out of reach of a search warrant," not through
any distinctions in expectations of privacy.56 The dissent in Carroll
took issue not with the exigency and mobility rationale, but with
the seemingly low level of suspicion needed to stop Carroll and
Kiro.5 7
The Supreme Court continued to rely on the exigency
rationale of the automobile exception for decades. 5 8 It was not
until Chambers, in 1970, that the Court made a break with the
exigency requirement.5 9 While the criminal defendants did not
prevail, the Court began expressing a consideration of private
Fourth Amendment interests, namely the extent of the
government's intrusion on the individual.6 0

B. The Lesser-Expectation of PrivacyRationale
The Court explained its Chambers decision in the 1985 case of
California v. Carney.61 There, the Court retained the mobility and
exigency arguments as part of the rationale, but also noted that an
automobile search has a relaxed warrant requirement because
there is a lower expectation of privacy in an automobile, as
compared to a home or office. 62 For example, Chief Justice Burger
pointed to pervasive regulation of automobiles.6 3 The Opperman

Duties on Merchandise and On Tonnage Admiralty Bond Act, ch. 35, §§ 48-51,
1 Stat. 145, 170 (1790); Law of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315
(1793).
56. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151. Indeed, the word "privacy" does not appear
once in the lengthy opinion. See generally Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
57. Id. at 169 (McReynold's, J., dissenting). There is a hint of a privacy
concern in Justice McReynold's opinion where he says "[e]vidently Congress
regarded the searching of private dwellings as matter of much graver
consequence than some other searches . . . ." Id. at 167.
58. The Court did not question the exigency rationale when it revisited the
exception in Husty or Brinegar.Husty, 282 U.S. at 700; Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
171. In Brinegar, the Court primarily relied on Carroll to determine whether
the officers had probable cause to stop the defendants, which was the main
issue. Brinegar,338 U.S. at 170.
59. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
60. Id. The Court considered whether an immediate search was a greater
intrusion than seizing the car and holding it until a search warrant could be
obtained. Id. Though the case was not explicitly mention in the opinion, this
consideration of the private interests follows from the Court's watershed
Fourth Amendment case, Katz, three years earlier. There the Court said that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
61. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985).
62. Id. The Court found the basis of its expectation of privacy reasoning in
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). That case involved the
routine inventory search of an automobile that had been impounded for
multiple parking ticket violations Id. at 365-66.
63. Id. at 392. Specifically, the opinion cited "periodic inspection and
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court also explained the lower expectation of privacy through the
"obviously public nature of automobile travel."64 The pervasive
regulation of automobiles serves to put the populace on notice that
the government's interests will outweigh the private interests,
obviating the need for a search warrant. 65
It is against this backdrop that the holding in Ross, allowing
the warrantless search of containers pursuant to the automobile
exception, makes more sense. 66 In Ross, police stopped an
individual suspected of selling drugs kept in the trunk of his car.6 7
In the trunk they found a closed brown paper bag.66 Instead of
seizing the bag and requesting a search warrant, the officer
opened the bag and discovered heroin.6 9 The police also found and
searched a zippered red leather pouch that contained 3,200 dollars
in cash. 70
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the search of the
containers separately from the search of the car. 7 1 The three-judge
panel that first heard the case considered whether the owner of
the container has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it to
determine the constitutionality of a warrantless search. 72 It
concluded that the search of the paper bag was legal, but the
search of the leather pouch was not.73 Upon rehearing en banc, the
court held that closed containers should not be treated differently,
but that a warrant should be obtained for any search of a closed
container. 74
licensing requirements," and that laws allow police to routinely stop vehicles
for expiration of license plates, excessive exhaust fumes, or noise. Id. (quoting
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368).
64. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368. The Opperman opinion quoted an earlier
case which reasoned automobiles had a lower expectation of privacy "because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as . . . the repository of
personal effects .

. .

. It travels through public thoroughfares where both its

occupants and its contents are in plain view." Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). The reasoning in Cardwell is less convincing today
where a motor home such as the one in Burgess certainly might serve as a
repository of personal effects and the contents of a computer inside would
rarely be in plain view in any literal sense. In any case, the Carney opinion did
not rely on this reasoning. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
65. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 (noting "[t]he public is fully aware that it is
accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling
governmental need for regulation.").
66. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
67. Id. at 800-01.
68. Id. at 801.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 802.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1150, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court
was concerned that determining the constitutionality of a search based on the
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The Supreme Court agreed that distinctions should not be
made based on the quality of the container.7 5 It broadly framed the
issue as a conflict "between the individual's constitutionally
protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective
law enforcement."7 6 While at first confirming that the decision in
Carroll was based on practical and exigency considerations,77 the
Court in its next breath said "subsequent cases make clear that
the decision in Carroll was not based on the fact that the only
course available to the police was an immediate search."7 8 The
cases cited, however, did not provide further illumination on
Carrollto justify the statement.79
The Ross court considered the argument that an individual's
expectation of privacy may be greater in a container in a car than
in the car itself.80 It also considered that the practical mobility
problems were not as great in a container as in an automobile, as
the former could be seized and more easily stored by the police.8 1
The Court was not persuaded by these arguments, however, and
purported to base its holding on a mix of practical and privacy
concerns.82

durability or quality of a particular container would be unmanageable for
courts and police. Id. It mused that this would draw police and courts into the
task of parsing out distinctions between a cotton purse and a silk one, a paper
container from leather, or a sack closed by a zipper instead of buttons. Id. at
1170. Future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the
opinion. Id. at 1159.
75. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 (arguing that search rules should apply to all
containers evenly). The Court was concerned with the same practical problems
as the Court of Appeals below. Id. It also worried that such distinctions could
lead to unequal treatment of people based on means of transporting items. Id.
It remarked "a traveler who carries a toothbrush and few articles of clothing
in a paper bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the
locked attache case." Id.
76. Ross, 456 U.S. at 804.
77. Id. at 806.
78. Id. at 807 n.9. The opinion cited Chambers and Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67 (1975) (per curiam), which held that if an immediate warrantless search of
a car is permissible, then a warrantless search soon after at the police
impound lot is also permissible. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.
79. White, 423 U.S. at 68. The brief per curiam opinion did not refer to
Carrollat all. See generally id. Instead, the Court relied entirely on Chambers.
Id.
80. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 811 (recognizing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977) analysis on the issue).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 822-23. It determined that the Carroll exception would be largely
useless if it was not permissible to include the search of containers within the
scope of an automobile search. Id. at 820.
The Court explained that the contraband for which the police would be
searching are, by their very nature, items that need to be concealed and will
likely be in closed containers when found in an automobile. Id. After a quick
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The Court also felt that individual privacy interests were
actually better served by allowing the search of containers when
probable cause supported it." It theorized situations where the
police, looking for drugs, would have to set aside suspicious
packages until a warrant could be issued and continue searching
the rest of the car to see if the object of their search could be found
outside of a container.84 The Court found that "an individual's
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not
survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is
transporting contraband."85 Thus, unwilling to make a distinction
between the expectation of privacy of an automobile and of a
container found in an automobile, the Court held it is permissible
to search both as long as probable cause exists to believe there was
contraband in the vehicle.86

survey of history, the Court made the amazingly broad claim that:
[During] virtually the entire history of our country-whether
contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster,
or a modern automobile-it has been assumed that a lawful search of a
vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the
object of the search.
Id. at 820 n.27. It apparently ignored its own prior cases with contrary
holdings. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12; Sanders, 422 U.S. at 766; Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981).
83. Ross 456 U.S. at 821.
84. Id. at 822. To bring this argument to its logical ending, while waiting
for a warrant for a container, the police could never be certain that the
suspected contraband was not hidden in some other part of the car,
necessitating the seizure of the car as well. Id.
85. Id. at 823. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment offers different
protection depending on the setting. Id. For example, a customs officer may
conduct a random search of a briefcase at the border, where the same
container and individual would be protected from this interference while
walking down the street. Id.
86. Id. at 825. The dissent in Ross opined that the majority not only
removed any limitations on warrantless automobile searches, but "repeal[ed]
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself." Id. at 827 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that a police officer's on-the-spot
determination of probable cause was no substitute for that of a "neutral and
detached magistrate." Id.
The dissent also highlighted the inconsistencies in the majority's
reasoning on mobility and expectation of privacy. Id. at 832. While the
majority purportedly relied on the mobility rationale of Carroll in its holding,
it did not explain how that can apply in the same way to a movable container,
which can be simply seized and immobilized until a warrant is granted. Id. at
828. The dissent also failed to see how the Court could find that a closed
container has a lesser expectation of privacy simply because it is in an
automobile. Id. at 832.
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C. Searches of Computers and Other Electronic Mass Storage
Devices
While the Supreme Court has not squarely faced the issue of
whether a laptop or similar device could be the object of an
automobile exception search, lower courts have had to deal with
some of the same concerns such a case would bring.87 For instance,
in the context of cell phone searches, some courts have decided to
treat them differently than other searchable items; other courts
have not.

1. Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest
In United States v. Park, the district court suppressed
warrantless searches of cell phones that were found incident to
arrest.8 8 The police did not search their phones immediately at the
time of the arrest, but waited until the defendants were in custody
and their personal items had been seized as part of the booking
process. 89 The government argued that the searches were lawful as
incident to arrest and that the cell phones should be considered
part of the person, and thus subject to a search even later on at
the jail.90 However, the court instead treated the phones as
"possessions within an arrestee's immediate control."91 The court
based this decision entirely on the special nature of modern cell
phones and their immense storage capacity, taking judicial notice
that the phones involved had features such as cameras, textmessaging, email, and address books. 92 The court declined to
extend the search incident to arrest warrant exception further
because it would permit the warrantless search of "a wide range of
electronic storage devices."93
87. See generally United States v. Park, No. CR05-375SI, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40596 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
88. Id. at *2. Police, acting on a warrant to search the defendants'
residence, found evidence of marijuana cultivation and arrested Park and two
others. Id. at *5.
89. Id. at*11.
90. Id. at *5.
91. See id. at *8-9 (concluding that cell phones found on an arrestee should
be classified as "possessions within an arrestee's immediate control"). This
meant that the police could have only conducted a warrantless search of the
phones at the time of the arrest, not later at the jail; see also id. at *1 (stating
a delayed "search of the person" is lawful but a delayed search of "possessions
within an arrestee's immediate control" is not).
92. Id. at *9. The government had argued at the suppression hearing that,
although the police officers only searched the phones' address books, they had
the authority to search anything stored on the phone, including emails and
messages. Id. at *8. The court saw that this kind of search, here looking for
evidence of marijuana trafficking, would extend the original rationale for
searches incident to arrest: to remove weapons for officer safety and prevent
the destruction of evidence. Id.
93. Id. at *9. In a similar case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that police
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The Fifth Circuit, however, took the view that police could
search a cell phone incident to arrest because it found the phone to
be part of the arrestee's person, and not just a possession within
the arrestee's immediate control. 94 The court did not explain its
decision except by finding that the phone was literally on his
person, and therefore not like the container in United States v.
Chadwick.95
2. Laptop Searches at the Border
United States v. Arnold provides a good example of the
different approaches courts have taken to reconcile an individual's
Fourth Amendment privacy interests with countervailing
government interests. There, the district court ruled to suppress
the fruit of a warrantless laptop search of the defendant, Michael
Arnold, which was conducted by the Customs and Border Patrol.96
The district court recognized that the government's interest in
preventing entry to unwanted persons and effects justifies the
warrantless search of things such as luggage, purses, and pockets
with no suspicion.97 However, the court noted that this interest is
not all-powerful, and some suspicion is required for highly
intrusive searches, such as strip-searches.9 8
The district court likened the intrusiveness of a computer
search to a strip-search and imposed a reasonable suspicion
requirement at the border.99 The court cited the immense amount
of information that computers can hold and the variety of personal
information people store on them.100 Thus, a computer search is
cannot conduct a warrantless search a cell phone seized during an arrest. Ohio
v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 170 (2009). The court refused to place cell
phones in the same category as closed containers which can be searched
without a warrant incident to an arrest. Id. at 168. It found that the amount of
personal information cell phones can hold gives them a higher expectation of
privacy. Id. at 169.
94. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-260 (5th Cir. 2007). In this
case, the police searched the phone's text messages and found messages that
were suggestive of narcotics distribution. Id. at 254.
95. Id. at 260.
96. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001, 1007 (C.D. Cal.
2006). Arnold's laptop was searched when he arrived at LAX airport,
returning from a trip to the Philippines. Id. at 1001. The customs officer asked
Arnold to turn on his computer to see if it was functioning. Id. Once it was
booted up, another officer clicked on desktop folders labeled "Kodak Pictures"
and "Kodak Memories." Id. The officer found pictures displaying nude women,
detained Arnold, and a more extensive warrantless search turned up images
suspected as child pornography. Id.
97. See id. at 1002 (recognizing a distinction for "border searches").

98. Id.
99. Id. at 1006-07.
100. Id. at 1003-04. The court noted several situations where highly
sensitive information might be kept on a computer: confidential client
information on an attorney's computer, trade secrets on an inventor's or
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"substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a
lunchbox or other tangible object."' 0
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
reasonable suspicion was not needed for a laptop search at the
border. 102 The court was not convinced that the search of a
computer was logically distinguishable from the search of a piece
of luggage. 103 Citing the Supreme Court's reluctance to distinguish
between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers, the court said that a
container should not be treated differently on the basis of its
storage capacity. 0 4
3.

Other Computer Searches

While the Ninth Circuit did not afford computers any more
protection at the border, it did find the unique nature of mass
storage devices critical in evaluating the lawfulness of computer
searches conducted with warrants. 0 5 The court was alarmed that
what should have been a targeted and limited search of computer
records had turned into a general search of the kind the Fourth
Amendment was intended to prohibit. 0 6 Thus, even a search of
computer hard drives authorized by a warrant deserves higher
corporate executive's computer, and confidential sources on a newspaper
reporter's computer. Id. at 1004.
101. Id. at 1003.
102. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth
Circuit expressly rejected the district court's analogy of the intrusiveness a
body cavity search requiring heightened suspicion to the intrusiveness of a
computer search. Id. at 1007-08.
103. Id. at 1009.
104. Id. at 1009-10. The court looked to Carney for guidance on worthy and
unworthy containers. Id. at 1009. The Court of Appeals did not give much
weight to Arnold's arguments on the volume and types of information a
computer could hold. Id. Whatever privacy interests a computer search
impinges upon, the important government interest in border security prevails.
Id. at 1007, 1009. The government argued that it was illogical to treat
electronically stored information differently than the same information in
hardcopy. Government's Opening Brief at 19, United States v. Arnold, 533
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-50581). If Arnold had carried photographs
portraying child pornography in a briefcase, there would be no problem with
the border search. Id. The government also highlighted the very personal
information that may be carried in a traveler's luggage, such as intimate
clothing, contraceptives, prescription medications, all of which may be found
in a legal search without any suspicion. Id. at 20.
105. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1004
(9th Cir. 2009). The government, investigating the use of illegal substances by
Major League Baseball players, obtained a warrant to search a diagnostic
facility for the drug test records of ten specific players. Id. at 993. In executing
the warrant, however, government agents seized and searched computer
records of hundreds of other baseball players and individuals for which they
had no probable cause (aside from the ten players listed specifically in the
warrant). Id.
106. Id. at 998.
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judicial scrutiny because of the privacy concerns of the individual
targeted and the common risk that other peoples' information,
totally uninvolved in an investigation, may be intermingled with
the target of the search. 07
Given the unique privacy concerns implicated by warrantless
searches of mass storage devices, many of the lower courts have
carved out specific exceptions and novel ways to deal with the
potential for government abuse that these searches present. 108 The
Supreme Court, in Acevedo, signaled its disfavor of special
exceptions for different kinds of containers. 09 Much has changed
in the digital world since 1991, however, when the Court decided
Acevedo.
IV. PROPOSAL

Whether one views the Fourth Amendment as requiring a
warrant or only evincing a warrant preference, the potential
intrusiveness of mass storage device searches demands that a
warrant be required for a search in the automobile context. An
exception to the automobile exception is called for. Computers are
different than briefcases, and a distinction should be made
between them and other containers. The burden of a warrant
requirement on law enforcement is low, and technology is making
that burden lower still. Because exigency was the original
rationale for the automobile exception, police should be free to do a
limited search without a warrant where such a search could stop a
crime in progress or provide some life-saving information.

107. Id. at 1005-06. The court set out several guidelines for magistrate
judges overseeing the execution of such a warrant. Id. Those include, but are
not limited to, insisting that the government waive any argument that the
plain view doctrine will apply (which would allow them to use as evidence
anything that they come across in their computer search) and having a thirdparty or government employee not involved in the investigation separate the
files on the computer that are the object of the search and those that are not,
giving the investigators only the information relevant to the warrant. Id.
108. E.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2010)
(eschewing the Ninth Circuit's approach in Comprehensive Drug Testing in
favor of a case-by-case approach; cautioning officers only to describe with
particularity the places to be searched in and things to be seized from a
computer); United States v. King, 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1229-30 (D. Haw.
2010) (noting that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that does not
comport with the "guidelines" laid out in Comprehensive Drug Testing should
not be excluded).
109. E.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579 (noting that "dual regimes" for
automobile searches that uncover containers are confusing, and that a clearcut rule is preferable).
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An Exception to the Exception

The automobile exception to the warrant requirement should
not apply to computers and other mass storage devices. Instead, if
police have probable cause to believe a mass storage device
contains criminal evidence, they should seize the device and not
search it unless and until they obtain a warrant. 110 If a magistrate
rejects the warrant request, police must promptly return the
device to its owner. In the unlikely situation that there is a truly
exigent circumstance, like a life-threatening emergency that could
possibly be remedied with information on the device, an immediate
search could be undertaken. In this way, individuals' special
privacy interests in mass storage devices remain protected while
the needs of law enforcement and public safety are still met.
B.

Mass Storage Devices Are 'Worthy" Containers

In Ross, the Supreme Court refused to make a distinction
between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers when considering
whether containers found in an automobile could be searched
without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception.'1 ' While
a person may use a laptop to store the same kind of information
that is stored in a briefcase, the manner of storage and the
capacity are entirely different. 112 Further, unlike any other
container heretofore imagined, technological advances continually
give mass storage devices greater capacity while they continue to

110. Of course, an individual has the ability to consent to a warrantless
search and could do so if he or she did not want to be burdened by a seizure of
their property. See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,
528-29 (1967) (stating "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant"). However, police should be
required to advise the individual that he or she does not have to consent and
the device will not be searched until a warrant is granted if no consent is
given. E.g., Carol A. Chase, Privacy Takes a Back Seat: Putting the Automobile
Exception Back on Track After Several Wrong Turns, 41 B.C. L. REV. 71, 98-99
(1999) (arguing that this practice also prevents claims that consent was not
given voluntarily). Otherwise, law enforcement will have less incentive to
speedily obtain a warrant, putting more pressure on the individual to give his
consent to the search.
111. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822. The Court decided the case in 1982, before mass
storage devices might routinely turn up in an automobile search. See History
of Laptop Computers, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.comllibrary/inventors
/bllaptop.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that the first laptop and
portable computers, some of which did not have any hard drive, became
commercially available in the early 1980s).
112. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the storage
capacity of modern mass storage devices); Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in
a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 538-40 (2005) (discussing the
dynamics and technical aspects of a computer search as compared to a more
traditional home search).
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get smaller physically."13 Finally, unlike most containers, the
amount of historical information that computers hold is
enormous.114 For example, documents that a user thought he had
deleted can be recovered by forensic computer technicians, and
operating systems and web browsers store information on how and
when a computer was used.15 Thus, a skilled forensic analyst
could reconstruct computer activity, in effect conducting
backward-looking surveillance.
In short, computers are different, and searches of them
should be treated differently. Even if the Supreme Court refuses to
abandon its reasoning in Ross and Acevedo that the expectation of
privacy in a container is suddenly diminished when placed by its
owner in an automobile, the proposed treatment of mass storage
devices is not foreclosed.1 16 There are still sufficient reasons to
place mass storage devices in a class by themselves. 117 Because of
the privacy concerns outlined above, the expectation of privacy in
mass storage devices is so high that even after being placed in an
automobile, it is still unreasonable to search without a warrant.
However, in light of the concerns raised by Ross about
distinguishing amongst containers, the exception should cover all
mass storage devices, from laptops to portable hard drives to cell
phones. This will make the rule clear and easy for police to
execute, a virtue the Supreme Court previously extolled.1 18
C. Requiring a Warrant for Searches of Mass StorageDevices Is
Not Overly Burdensome for Law Enforcement
The burden of getting a warrant is significantly lower than it
was at the time Carroll was decided. 1 9 In the electronic age, a
113. See Orin Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 279, 302 (2005) (noting that electronic storage capacity
doubles approximately every two years). Professor Kerr likens a computer
search to the search of an entire city block, and in the near future it will be
more like a search of an entire city because of further advances in technology.
Id. at 303.
114. Kerr, supranote 112, at 542.
115. Id. at 542-43. Microsoft Word creates temporary files from which an
analyst can reconstruct the evolution of a particular document. Id. at 543. Web
browsers track and store very specific use information, such as actual search

terms. Id.
116. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Ross).
117. See supra notes 3, 111, 112, 113 and accompanying text (detailing the
capacity and nature of personal information kept in mass storage devices).
118. Part of the Court's justification for extending the automobile exception
further in Acevedo was to provide a clear rule for law enforcement officers.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 577 (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682
(1988)) (recognizing the importance of providing "clear and unequivocal
guidelines to the law enforcement profession").
119. See Chase, supra note 110, at 87 (stating that in the 1920s it may have
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search warrant can be obtained in minutes instead of days. 120
Federal law provides for telephonic search warrants,1 21 which are
also available in many states. 122 California even allows for
proposed warrants and supporting declarations to be sent to the
magistrate via email. 123 In some instances, courts have rejected an
exigency justification for a warrantless search due to the
availability of a telephonic warrant request.124
In addition, the nature of how information is stored on a
computer makes an on-the-spot search ineffective. Often, it will
need to be conducted by a forensic computer technician at a
laboratory or the police station.125 This necessarily implies that
many searches will be delayed, so obtaining a warrant to search
the computer will probably not result in a significant hindrance to
the police.

taken several hours or days to obtain a warrant and return to the place to be
searched).
120. Id. at 89.
121. "A magistrate judge may issue a warrant based on information
communicated by telephone or other appropriate means, including reliable
electronic means." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(3)(a). Federal courts have estimated
that it may take as little as twenty minutes to obtain a telephonic search
warrant. United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.651(2), (3) (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 179.045(2) (LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4406 (1999); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-8(a) (LexisNexis 2009); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 36.02 (2008);
N.D. R. CRIM. P. RULE 41(2)(A) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(6)(a) (2007);
WIS. STAT. § 968.12(3)(a) (2009). In a California case, police obtained a
warrant to search a home for drugs in just twelve minutes. People v. Aguirre,
26 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 11 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1972).
123. Cal. Penal Code § 817(c)(2) (West 2009).
124. E.g., United States v. Patino, 830 F.2d 1413, 1416 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding lack of exigent circumstances where officer could have requested
warrant telephonically during thirty minute wait for back-up); United States
v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that when using an
exigency exception, the government's burden is to show that warrantless entry
was imperative, and this burden is not met unless it shows that it did not have
time to get a warrant telephonically); but see United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d
990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that potential
availability of telephonic warrant eliminated the exigency of the situation).
Many state courts have also considered the availability of a telephonic
warrant when evaluating exigency arguments. See State v. Flannigan, 978
P.2d 127, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the involved police department
was able to obtain a warrant in as little as fifteen minutes); Sapen v. State,
869 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (suppressing the fruits of a
warrantless search where no telephonic warrant was requested in part
because the State's telephonic warrant statute "lessen[s] the need for
warrantless searches").
125. Kerr, supra note 112, at 537 n.20; see also Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090
("Practically speaking, the forensic search of a hard drive ... will rarely be
conducted at the 'site' while searching an automobile, given the potential to
corrupt or lose evidence.").
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D. Expediency Only Goes So Far
Although it may be more convenient for the police to conduct
the search right then and there, police expediency must give way
to privacy at some point. The unique qualities of mass storage
devices highlight that point. The Fourth Amendment is not an
inconvenience for the police to overcome; rather, it is "a restraint
on Executive power." 126 As technology allows people to carry more
of their personal effects in their vehicles, the potential for abusive
and intrusive searches increases. It is important that a detached
and neutral magistrate, not a law enforcement officer "engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," 127 makes
the determination of whether there is probable cause to invade a
person's privacy through a search. 128
E. The ProposalApplied
When faced with a situation like that in Part I,129 the police
should handle the situation differently. Upon making a probable
cause determination to search the laptop in the backseat, the
officer would ask Joe for his permission to conduct a search,
advising him that if he declines they will request a warrant.
Assuming he does not give permission, the officer would, if
possible, request a warrant telephonically. If it appears to the
officer that he will have an answer on the warrant request within
a relatively brief period of time, he would hold Joe at the scene (in
this case he will already be under arrest for the cocaine
possession).
If the warrant request is granted, he can conduct a brief
search on the scene or back at the station. If the request is denied
he obviously cannot search. If a telephonic warrant is not
available, the officer should seize the laptop, secure it at the
station, and search it only if a warrant is granted later.130
126. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
further commented that "the Court has recognized the importance of this
restraint as a bulwark against police practices that prevail in totalitarian
regimes." Id.
127. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (1948).
128. In other contexts, the Court has looked with disfavor on government
arguments that a search should be held valid because it would have been
sanctioned by a warrant had they requested one. See id. at 12, 17 (search of
hotel room for drugs); Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 356 (search of public telephone
through wiretaps for evidence of illegal gambling).
129. SupraPart I, pp. 1-2.
130. The Fourth Amendment also prohibits unreasonable seizures. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The Court in Chambers would only say that it was
"arguable" that an immediate search is more intrusive than seizing and
holding the car until a warrant is issued. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52. The
Court was referring to the seizure and immobilization of an automobile, not
just a container within it. Id. The seizure of the laptop will at least be

2010]

How FarCan the Automobile Exception Go?
V.

1141

CONCLUSION

If courts use the automobile exception to justify warrantless
searches of mass storage devices, the exception will be stretched
much further than originally imagined. With computer technology
becoming ever more pervasive in our lives, the potential for highly
intrusive searches also increases. There has already been judicial
recognition that electronically stored information is worthy of
special precautions .during police searches and seizures. The
Supreme Court, when presented squarely with the issue, should
err on the side of caution, making sure privacy interests in mass
storage devices outweigh the interest in police expediency and
convenience. The spirit and continued vitality of the Fourth
Amendment require no less.

supported by the officer's determination of probable cause because he will
have necessarily made one in order to request a warrant. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. (stating "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . .").

